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Abstract
The outbreak of an infectious disease in a human population can lead to individuals
responding with preventive measures in an attempt to avoid getting infected. This leads
to changes in contact patterns. However, as we show in this paper, rational behaviour at
the individual level, such as social distancing from infectious contacts, may not always be
beneficial for the population as a whole. We use epidemic network models to demonstrate
the potential negative consequences at the population level. We take into account the so-
cial structure of the population through several network models. As the epidemic evolves,
susceptible individuals may distance themselves from their infectious contacts. Some in-
dividuals replace their lost social connections by seeking new ties. We show that social
distancing can worsen the disease outcome both in the initial phase of an outbreak and the
final epidemic size. Moreover, the same negative effect can arise in real-world networks.
Our results suggest that one needs to be careful when targeting behavioural changes as they
could potentially worsen the epidemic outcome. Furthermore, network structure crucially
influences the way that individual-level measures impact the epidemic at the population
level. These findings highlight the importance of careful analysis of preventive measures in
epidemic models.
Keywords epidemic spread; networks; individual preventive behaviour; social distancing;
population-level outcome
1 Introduction
Mathematical models for the spread of infections have been succesfully used to increase under-
standing of how epidemics may propogate: what are the most important features to determine
the initial epidemic growth, final epidemic size or endemic level? Mathematical models are also
useful to evaluate the possible effects on epidemic dynamics of preventive measures. This can
guide public health officials to decide what measures could be put in place to reduce or even stop
spreading of a disease [1].
To prevent or control an epidemic, public health authorities may implement measures by
e.g. isolating/treating detected infectious cases or starting a vaccination scheme, either before
or during the outbreak [1]. In addition, individuals may take their own measures to prevent
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themselves from getting infected, e.g. by wearing face masks, taking hygienic measures such
as hand washing, or by socially distancing themselves from infectious contacts. Such individual
behaviour has been observed in e.g. the recent Ebola outbreak and the 2009 A/H1N1 epidemic [2–
6].
In general, it is hard to predict the effect of preventive measures without using models to
guide us. Epidemic dynamics are highly nonlinear and therefore preventive measures can lead to
counter-intuitive effects. Standard epidemic models assume human behaviour is not influenced
by the epidemic and is constant over time. Although it is often recognized that humans do
take preventive measures in the course of an epidemic, models that incorporate behavioural
dynamics are generally much harder to analyze. Recently, such models have started to receive
more attention, and important advances have been made to gain understanding of the effect of
different behavioural changes on epidemic dynamics [7–10].
A crucial modelling ingredient is the contact pattern in the population as infection is trans-
mitted through contacts between susceptible and infectious individuals. Owing to challenges in
their analysis, the majority of models that consider behavioural responses to epidemic dynamics
are relatively simple in modelling contact patterns [10]. Often the simplest assumption of ho-
mogeneous mixing, or some variant, is made. This assumption implies that any two individuals
rarely meet more than once in a large population. To overcome the restriction of the lack of
repeated contacts, network epidemic models have been proposed to model human contact pat-
terns. This class of models have received much attention over the last 20 years or so [11, 12].
In these models, individuals are socially connected in the network and infection is only possible
along connections. Network models are also a natural way to incorporate heterogeneity in the
number of connections that individuals in the population have. Throughout this paper, we refer
to two individuals that are connected to each other as ‘neighbours’. Exactly what a neighbour
is depends on the social structure under consideration, e.g. one may think of the neighbours as
‘colleagues’ in workplaces or ‘sexual partners’ in sexual networks.
In the current paper we study a network SIR epidemic with preventive social distancing.
We consider the setting where susceptible individuals distance themselves from their neighbours
who they find out are infectious, perhaps sometimes simply dropping such connections and
other times, in their wish to maintain a certain number of social connections, by seeking new
connections (which we refer to as ‘rewiring’). We study the impact of social distancing on model
networks as well as real-world networks.
We show that rational preventive individual-level behaviour can have counter-intuitive neg-
ative population-level consequences. From the perspective of an individual who distances
him/herself from an infectious individual, this preventive behaviour is always rational in the
sense that it decreases the risk of him/her getting infected during the epidemic outbreak (here
‘always’ means for all rewiring and dropping rates on all networks). However, we also show that
having individuals who rewire away from infectious neighbours and possibly replace them with
new ties may be harmful for the community as a whole. Depending on the network structure
of the population, social distancing may in fact increase the epidemic threshold parameter from
below to above its threshold value, making a large outbreak possible where without social distan-
cing it was not. We also show that social distancing can increase the final size of the epidemic.
It is important to stress that these features do not hold for all networks. However, we show that
there are real-world networks as well as model networks which exhibit these properties. It is
difficult to characterize completely when such individual preventive behaviour is harmful, but it
tends to happen more easily if: a) the basic reproduction number R0 or the related clique repro-
duction number R∗ (for the baseline setting without social distancing) is large, b) the network
has many individuals with low degree and possibly other groups being highly inter-connected,
and c) connections are more likely to be rewired than dropped.
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2 Model
2.1 SIR epidemic with social distancing on a network
We consider a population in which individuals are socially connected. Two individuals that
are connected to each other are referred to as neighbours and contacts are only made between
neighbours. The individuals and the connections between them together make up the network
structure of the population. The stochastic SIR (susceptible-infectious-recovered) epidemic with
social distancing on a network is as follows. Initially, usually one individual is infectious, we
call this individual the index case, and all others in the population are susceptible (specific
assumptions concerning the index case are given later). An individual that gets infected becomes
infectious and remains so for an exponentially distributed time with mean 1/γ. During its
infectious period an individual transmits infection at a constant rate β independently to each
susceptible neighbour. Moreover, a susceptible individual that has an infectious neighbour drops
that connection at rate ωd and rewires the connection to an individual chosen uniformly at
random from the population at rate ωr. We write ω = ωr + ωd for the total social distancing
rate. One can think of ωr = αω and ωd = (1 − α)ω, where ω represents the rate at which a
susceptible individual finds out that a given neighbour is infectious, and α = ωr/(ωr + ωd) is
the probability that the individual wishes to retain his/her number of neighbours. Dropping and
rewiring events happen independently between all pairs of susceptible and infectious individuals.
The epidemic continues until there is no connected susceptible-infectious pair of individuals.
Note that the preventive measure of social distancing is always beneficial from the individual
perspective. Indeed, a susceptible individual that distances itself from an infectious neighbour
avoids the risk of getting infected by that particular individual. In the case that it chooses to
replace that social connection (rewiring), and that new neighbour is recovered (and immune),
transmission can no longer occur through that connection. If the neighbour is susceptible, trans-
mission through that connection could occur later on in the epidemic. If the neighbour is infec-
tious, then all that has happened from an epidemic point of view is that one infectious neighbour
is replaced by another one, and the risk of becoming infected is unchanged. Obviously, the
most beneficial option from the point of view of avoiding getting infected is not to replace the
connection (corresponding to ωr = 0 and ωd > 0 in the model). This extreme case of dropping
connections is always beneficial from both the individual and population perspective and can in
fact be analysed mathematically (F Ball, T Britton, KY Leung, D Sirl (2018). An SIR network
epidemic model with preventive dropping of edges. Manuscript in preparation).
The epidemic with social distancing is studied on two network models as well as two real-
world networks. The networks are described in Section 2.2 below. Our results in Section 3 involve
several epidemiological measures for the beginning and the end of the epidemic, these concepts
are introduced in Section 2.3.
2.2 The networks
2.2.1 Configuration network
The configuration model is a well-studied network, both within and without the context of
epidemic models [13–15]. The network is constructed by first defining its degree distribution
{pd}, where pd is the probability that an individual has exactly d connections. In a population of
size n, each of the n individuals picks a degree independently from {pd} and attaches that many
half-edges to itself. Half-edges are then paired completely at random and the corresponding
individuals are connected in the network. By way of this construction, some imperfections may
arise, such as self loops or multiple connections between some pairs of individuals. However,
3
such imperfections become sparse in the network as the population size n → ∞ if the degree
distribution has finite variance (see e.g. [16, Theorem 3.1.2]). Therefore, it is safe to remove such
imperfections and assume that the configuration network is a simple undirected network with the
prescribed degree distribution [17]. We denote the mean and variance of the degree distribution
{pd} by µD and σ
2
D, respectively.
2.2.2 Clique network
The clique-network model [18] (also referred to as household-network model when the unit under
consideration is interpreted as a household) has two types of connections: global network connec-
tions and clique connections. The global network structure is obtained through the configuration
network with prescribed degree distribution {pd}. On top of this, the community is partitioned
into distinct units (cliques) of size three (see SI Section S2 for a discussion on allowing for various
clique sizes). The population can be partitioned into cliques by labelling all individuals from 1
to n, and letting the first three individuals make up clique 1, the next three individuals make up
clique 2, and so on. In the final network, individual 1 is then connected to all individuals he/she
is connected to from the construction of the configuration model together with individuals 2 and
3 from the clique construction, and similarly for the other individuals. As with the configuration
network, the clique configuration network can be treated as a simple undirected network.
2.2.3 Real-world networks
The real-world networks for our studies are taken from the Stanford large network dataset col-
lection [19], where datasets for several different networks are freely available. We considered the
‘collaboration network for arXiv General Relativity’ and the ‘Facebook social circles network’.
Both networks are undirected. The ‘arXiv General Relativity collaboration’ network describes
scientific collaborations between authors that submitted papers to the arXiv in the General Re-
lativity and Quantum Cosmology category. Edges between nodes represent two co-authors that
have written a paper together. In the ‘Facebook social circles’ network, nodes are survey parti-
cipants of the social network website Facebook that were using a specific app. Edges between
nodes represent the ‘circles’ or ‘friends lists’ of those participants. More details are found in [19]
and SI Section S3.1.
2.3 Epidemiological quantities: R0, R∗, and the final size
In general, the social distancing model is challenging to analyze mathematically (see [20] for
analysis of the beginning of an epidemic on the configuration network). As the network structure
depends on the epidemic dynamics, models very soon become intractable. Therefore, in the main
text we present the heuristics of our analytical results and refer to SI for the mathematical details.
In Section 3 the main focus is on our findings from simulation studies. Here, we present the key
epidemiological concepts that are used in Section 3.
For the beginning of the epidemic, in the configuration network model we use the basic
reproduction number R0 that has the interpretation as the expected number of secondary cases
generated by one typical newly infected individual at the beginning of the epidemic. The number
R0 is a threshold parameter with threshold value one in the sense that, in the limit as the
population size n→∞, there is a positive probability of a major outbreak (one which infects a
strictly positive fraction of the population as n → ∞) if R0 > 1 and no major outbreak occurs
if R0 ≤ 1. Owing to stochastic effects, it is always possible that an epidemic dies out when
introduced into a population (with finite size n) even when R0 > 1. Previous work ([20]; see
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also SI Section S1.2 ) showed that the basic reproduction number R0 for the epidemic on the
configuration network with social distancing is given by
R0 =
β
β + ω + γ
(
µD +
σ2D
µD
− 1
)
, (1)
where µD + σ
2
D/µD − 1 is the expected number of susceptible connections of a typical newly
infected individual in the early stages of an epidemic and β/(β + ω + γ) is the probability of
transmitting to such a susceptible individual before he/she recovers or the neighbour drops the
connection or rewires away.
Related to R0 is the clique reproduction number R∗ (also referred to as the household repro-
duction number when the cliques under consideration are households), which is more natural to
consider when studying populations with a clique structure. Rather than considering a newly
infected individual, one considers a newly infected clique as the unit of interest. The same
threshold behaviour holds. The clique reproduction number R∗ is derived in Section 3.2 and
SI Section S2.1.
For an epidemic on both the configuration network and the clique network, as population
size n tends to infinity, the final fraction Z¯n of individuals that ever get infected converges in
distribution to random variable Z¯ with two-point distribution: P (Z¯ = 0) = 1−P (Z¯ = z). In the
event of a major outbreak, the limiting final fraction of the population infected by the epidemic
is z. In general, this constant z is only characterized implicitly, even for the simplest Markovian
homogeneously mixing SIR epidemic model. We use the practical definition in our simulation
studies in Section 3 that an epidemic outbreak is major if the final number of infected individuals
is more than 10% of the total population size. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we scale
time such that the transmission rate is β = 1 per time unit, so all rates are interpreted as relative
to the transmission rate β. More details on the simulation studies are provided in SI Section S4.
We call the model without social distancing (ωr = 0 = ωd) the baseline model.
3 Results
3.1 The configuration network
Social distancing in the configuration network is always beneficial at the beginning of an epidemic
in the sense that it lowers R0. This conclusion follows immediately from expression (1). In fact,
social distancing can ensure that R0 is reduced below the epidemic threshold value of one, see
Fig. 1B for an example. At the beginning of an epidemic, from the point of view of a susceptible
individual, social distancing from an infective neighbour more or less ensures that he/she avoids
infection. Indeed, there are only few infectives in the population in that stage of the epidemic.
This makes it unlikely for a susceptible individual to encounter another infectious individual at
the beginning of the epidemic.
However, social distancing need not be beneficial for the population as a whole. In fact,
even though rewiring decreases R0, it can still lead to an increase in the final size. To show
analytically that the expected final size can increase with ω we consider a very specific degree
distribution, where individuals have either degree 0 or degree k, where k > 2, i.e. p0 = 1 − pk
(proving things for more general degree distributions seems very hard). We analyze a related
model that allows us to derive an asymptotic lower bound for the model of interest. In the related
model, we consider an SI infection (γ = 0). Then continuity arguments ensure that our results
also hold for an SIR infection with γ > 0 small enough. Individuals act differently depending
on their degree. A susceptible individual that tries to rewire to a randomly chosen individual v
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in the population will not do so if v is of degree k. If v is of degree 0, then rewiring takes place
as usual, but v is prohibited from transmitting to other individuals. Therefore, the number of
infections in the modified model is always less than in the original model (and is equal in the
baseline model when there is no social distancing). For this modified model, we can derive an
expression for the asymptotic final size, yielding a lower bound for that quantity in our social
distancing model, and consequently proves that the final size can increase for small ω > 0 and
γ > 0. The details of the analysis are found in SI Section S1.3.
Rather than providing details for the analytical results for the final size here, we demonstrate
the negative population level effects through simulation studies. We consider the social distancing
model on a configuration network with heterogeneous degree distribution in Fig. 1. Parameter
values are such that the basic reproduction number R0 is large in the baseline setting and the
majority of the social distancing is done through rewiring rather than dropping. The epidemic
is started with 10 index cases (chosen uniformly at random from the population) in order to
have most of the simulations resulting in major outbreaks. Additional results showing that
social distancing can increase the final size for several other configuration network models are
presented in SI Section S1.4.
Note that the fraction of epidemics that result in major outbreaks decreases with increasing
social distancing rates (Fig. 1B). Once the social distancing rate ω increases to a level such
that the basic reproduction number drops below the epidemic threshold value of one (Fig. 1B),
mostly minor outbreaks will occur. Finally, we note that deviations from the average final size are
generally small (also compared to the total population size of 5000), especially when conditioning
on the occurrence of a major outbreak.
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Figure 1: Social distancing can lead to an increase in the final size for the configuration network model.
(A) Average final size (with 95% confidence intervals (CI)) over all outbreaks (solid line) and restricted
to major outbreaks (dashed line); the dotted horizontal line is at the final size when ω = 0, for reference.
(B) R0 as a function of social distancing rate ω (dashed black line at R0 = 1 indicates the threshold
value) and fraction of all outbreaks resulting in major outbreaks (with 95% CI). Model parameters are as
follows. An individual in the population has degree d with d = 0, . . . , 10 with probability pd = c/(d+1),
d = 0, 1, . . . , 10, with c = 0.331 the normalization constant. Other parameter values are ωr/ωd = 9 and
1/γ = 10 time units, total population size 5000, and each epidemic starts with 10 randomly chosen index
cases. For each value of ω, 500 epidemics are simulated.
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3.2 The clique network
In the clique network individual preventive social distancing can have a negative population-
level effect already at the beginning of an epidemic. To demonstrate this we consider R∗ for the
clique-network model. The clique reproduction number R∗ is derived by differentiating between
two types of newly infected cliques. A newly infected clique at first consists of one newly infected
individual while the remaining clique members are susceptible. The two types are determined by
the way the newly infected individual u∗ was infected: (1) u∗ was infected by a global neighbour
(i.e. outside his/her own clique) that it had already before the start of the epidemic or (2) u∗
was infected by a global neighbour that it acquired through a social distancing event during
the epidemic. The clique reproduction number is the dominant eigenvalue of the 2 × 2 matrix
(Kij)i,j=1,2, where Kij is the expected number of cliques of type j generated by one newly
infected clique of type i. Details of the derivation of the Kij are found in SI Section S2.1.
We find an explicit expression for R∗ that we can analyse as a function of social distancing for
different degree distributions (see SI Section S2.2 ). We illustrate these analytical results with
numerical examples in Fig. 2.
As can be seen in Fig. 2A, R∗ can increase as a function of the social distancing rate ω.
In particular, social distancing can move the epidemic threshold R∗ from below to above its
threshold value of one. In other words, individual preventive measures that are beneficial at the
individual level can cause a major outbreak to become possible while without the preventive
measures this is not possible. However, this depends heavily on the precise network structure. In
Fig. 2B, the degree distribution is chosen such that R∗ decreases for all social distancing rates.
See SI Section S2 for more details and examples of the dependence of R∗ on social distancing.
Note that R∗ will eventually decrease for large enough social distancing rates as can be seen in
Fig. 2A.
In settings where social distancing pushes R∗ from below to above the threshold for an
epidemic to occur, the effect of social distancing on the final size is large (Fig. 2C). Moreover,
even in settings where social distancing reduces R∗, the final size can initially increase when
social distancing is introduced into the model (Fig. 2D).
3.3 Application to real-world networks
We consider two real-world networks: the collaboration network of arXiv General Relativity and
social circles from Facebook, taken from [19]. We simulate SIR epidemics with social distancing
on these two real-world networks (see SI Section S3.1 for details). In Fig. 3 we demonstrate that
social distancing can have a negative effect at the population level by increasing the final size in
the collaboration network. Further examples with substantially different parameter values but
qualitatively the same results are presented in SI Fig. S5.
The second real-life network that we consider the social distancing epidemic model on is the
Facebook social circles in Fig. 4. This serves to demonstrate that the precise network structure
plays a crucial role for the effect that social distancing can have on the final size. We find
that if we restrict to only the major outbreaks, then a modest increase in the final size can be
observed when compared to the baseline setting. On the other hand, the average final size is
more or less unaffected by social distancing for sufficiently small social distancing rates. This
can be explained by the network structure of the underlying population. Since all individuals are
part of the same connected component that contains many connections, i.e. all individuals are
(indirectly) connected to each other, modest social distancing rates will not change the network
structure in a way that significantly alters transmission patterns (see SI Section S3.1 for network
summary statistics).
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Figure 2: The effect of social distancing on the epidemic threshold parameter R∗ and the final size. The
fraction of epidemics resulting in major outbreaks (with 95% CI) and R∗ for (A) mean infectious period
1/γ = 100 time units and two-point degree distribution with p0 = 1/2 = p1 and (B) mean infectious
period 1/γ = 10 time units and two-point degree distribution with p0 = 1/2 = p3. Average final size
with (dashed) and without (solid) conditioning on a major outbreak (with 95% CI) corresponding to
(C) scenario A (D) scenario B; dotted horizontal lines are for comparison with the size at ω = 0. Other
parameter values are as follows: cliques have size 3, the population size is 5000 and ωr/ωd = 9. Each
epidemic is initiated with one randomly chosen infected individual and for each value of ω, 500 epidemics
are simulated.
8
0 1 2 3 4
ω
0
2000
4000
fi
n
a
l
si
z
e
A
major
all
0
.0
0
.2
0
.4
0
.6
0
.8
1
.0
1
.2
1
.4
1
.6
1
.8
2
.0
2
.2
2
.4
2
.6
2
.8
3
.0
3
.2
3
.4
3
.6
3
.8
4
.0
ω
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
m
a
jo
r
o
u
tb
re
a
k
s
B
Figure 3: Social distancing can increase the final size of the epidemic on real-world networks for large
recovery rate. Social distancing in the arXiv collaboration network. (A) The average final size with
(dashed) and without (solid) conditioning on a major outbreak (with 95% CI); dotted horizontal lines
are for the size of the giant component (top) and comparison with the size at ω = 0 (bottom two).
(B) Fraction of all outbreaks that resulted in major outbreaks (with 95% CI). Model parameter values
are: mean infectious period 1/γ = 2 time units and social distancing ωr/ωd = 9. For each value of ω,
500 epidemics are simulated. The index case is chosen uniformly at random from the sub-population of
individuals that has median degree and are part of the largest connected component of the network.
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Figure 4: Social distancing in the facebook social circles network with randomly chosen index case with
median degree. (A) The average final size over all outbreaks (solid) and conditioning on major outbreaks
(dashed) (with 95% CI); dotted horizontal lines are for the size of the network (top) and comparison with
the size at ω = 0 (bottom two). (B) Fraction of all outbreaks that resulted in major outbreaks (with
95% CI). Model parameter values are: mean infectious period 1/γ = 2 time unites and social distancing
ωr/ωd = 9. For each value of ω, 500 epidemics are simulated. The index case is randomly chosen from
the population that has median degree.
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4 Conclusion and discussion
In the event of an epidemic outbreak in a population, individuals may take preventive measures
by changing their contact patterns. Individuals may try to avoid infection by social distancing
from infectious contacts. While this behaviour is always rational at the individual level, it
may be harmful at the population level. In fact, preventive social distancing can increase the
final epidemic size at the population level and thus have negative effects for the community at
large. We demonstrated this counter-intuitive result by means of different epidemic network
models, as well as simulating epidemics with social distancing on existing real-world networks.
Similar conclusions in terms of behavioural changes at the individual level and its population-level
consequences have been drawn in [21, 22] for different behavioural change models. Both [21, 22]
considered changes in human mobility patterns in the event of an epidemic and its consequences
for the geographical spread. Using a metapopulation model, they illustrated that individual
preventive measures in mobility patterns can lead to epidemic spread in new locations, although
their invasion thresholds are always increasing [21] or even independent [22] of the behavioural
changes, which is quite different from the dependence on social distancing of the threshold
parameters R0 and R∗ in our models.
Whether or not social distancing will actually have negative epidemic outcomes depends
strongly on the social network structure of the population. We demonstrated that social dis-
tancing can have different effects in the initial stages of the epidemic compared to the overall
epidemic outbreak size. We considered the spread of an SIR epidemic on the clique-network
model and the configuration network model. We showed that social distancing can have negative
effects for the community by (i) increasing the epidemic threshold parameter R∗ from below to
above the threshold value of one in clique-networks with high clustering and (ii) by increasing the
final size. Point (ii) for the final size was shown in (a) configuration networks with heterogeneous
degree distribution, (b) clique-networks, and (c) a real-life collaboration network.
In general, in the baseline setting that an epidemic outbreak may occur when no preventive
measures are taken, social distancing can always have beneficial effects provided that the rate
of social distancing is sufficiently large (e.g. Fig. 3A). Indeed, sufficiently large social distancing
rates can prevent an epidemic from taking off by reducing the epidemic threshold parameter from
above to below its threshold value. In such cases, social distancing ensures that only a small
number of individuals get infected by the epidemic, while in the baseline setting a significant
fraction of the population may be infected.
Whereas social distancing never increases ones own risk of getting infected in our model,
through rewiring, it can increase the risk for other individuals, e.g. by connecting to individuals
that were previously not (so heavily) exposed to the epidemic. How and whether or not social
distancing affects the population-level epidemic outcome depend on a variety of factors. Most
notably, the network structure plays an important role (e.g. Fig. 2). Besides the network itself,
the infectious disease under consideration is also of importance. For infectious diseases with long
mean infectious periods, social distancing can have negative population level epidemic outcomes
for a much larger range of social distancing rates compared to infections with shorter mean
infectious periods (e.g. Fig. 3 and SI Fig. S5 ). Furthermore, social distancing where the majority
of connections are rewired rather than dropped can more easily lead to negative effects at the
population level. The same seems to apply when R0 or R∗ is high and the community has many
individuals with low degrees and/or the community has highly connected cliques. In such cases,
rewiring may introduce or increase connections to otherwise relatively isolated individuals. In
this way the smaller chance of the individual who takes preventive measures getting infected is
outweighed by the increased risk of transmission to a larger part of the population in the event
of infection.
10
Although it is generally recognised that individual preventive measures are often taken once
awareness of an epidemic is in place, it is not well understood how to model changes in individual
behaviour. Here we considered the effect of social distancing on an epidemic. We modelled this on
a contact network by assuming that susceptible individuals distance themselves from infectious
contacts, allowing for both dropping of connections and replacement with new contacts in the
desire to sustain a certain number of social contacts. Social behaviour is far more complex
than our social distancing model, and many behavioural changes will depend on the epidemic
and population under consideration (e.g. risk perception is an important factor). However,
the aim of our paper is to show that rational individual-level preventive measures can have
counter-intuitive consequences for the population-level. Public health interventions that aim at
changing individual behaviour through social distancing could have adverse consequences, for
example school closures could reduce social contacts between children in the school classes but
may (partly) be replaced by social contacts outside of school. As our results show, it is not
necessarily straightforward what effects such behaviour may have at the population level. These
findings highlight the importance of modelling individual level behavioural changes in response
to an epidemic to understand infectious disease dynamics.
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